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THE EROSION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN
THE UNITED STATES TODAY
Richard H. Kohn

I

n over thirty-five years as a military historian, I have come to have great respect for and trust in American military officers. The United States is truly
blessed to have men and women of the highest character leading its youth and
safeguarding its security. That fact makes the present subject all the more troubling and unpleasant, whether to write or read about it. However, the subject is
crucial to the nation’s security and to its survival as a republic. I am speaking of a
tear in the nation’s civil and political fabric; my hope is that by bringing it to the
attention of a wide military and defense readership I can prompt a frank, open
discussion that could, by raising the awareness of the American public and alerting the armed forces, set in motion a process of healing.
My subject is the civil-military relationship at the pinnacle of the government, and my fear, baldly stated, is that in recent years civilian control of the
military has weakened in the United States and is threatened today. The issue
is not the nightmare of a coup d’état but rather the evidence that the American military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its
own perspective on many policies and decisions. What I have detected is no
conspiracy but repeated efforts on the part of the armed forces to frustrate or
evade civilian authority when that opposition seems likely to preclude outcomes the military dislikes.
While I do not see any crisis, I am convinced that civilian control has diminished to the point where it could alter the character of American government
and undermine national defense. My views result from nearly four decades of
reading and reflection about civilian control in this country; from personal observation from inside the Pentagon during the 1980s; and since then, from
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watching the Clinton and two Bush administrations struggle to balance national
security with domestic political realities.
Understanding the problem begins with a review of the state of civil-military relations during the last nine years, a state of affairs that in my judgment has been
extraordinarily poor, in many respects as low as in any period of American
peacetime history. No president was ever as reviled by the professional military—treated with such disrespect, or viewed with such contempt—as Bill
Clinton. Conversely, no administration ever treated the military with more fear
and deference on the one hand, and indifference and neglect on the other, as the
Clinton administration.
The relationship began on a sour note during the 1992 campaign. As a youth,
Clinton had avoided the draft, written a letter expressing “loathing” for the military, and demonstrated against the Vietnam War while in Britain on a Rhodes
scholarship. Relations turned venomous with the awful controversy over gays in
the military, when the administration—in ignorance and arrogance—announced
its intention to abolish the ban on open homosexual service immediately, without
study or consultation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by resisting, floating rumors of their own and dozens of other resignations, encouraging their retired
brethren to arouse congressional and public opposition, and then more or less
1
openly negotiating a compromise with their commander in chief.
The newly elected president was publicly insulted by service people (including a two-star general) in person, in print, and in speeches. So ugly was the behavior that commanders had to remind their subordinates of their constitutional and
legal obligations not to speak derogatorily of the civilian leadership; the Air Force
chief of staff felt obliged to remind his senior commanders “about core values,
including the principle of a chain of command that runs from the president
2
right down to our newest airman.”
Nothing like this had ever occurred in American history. This was the most
open manifestation of defiance and resistance by the American military since
the publication of the Newburgh addresses over two centuries earlier, at the
close of the American war for independence. Then the officers of the Army
openly contemplated revolt or resignation en masse over the failure of Congress
to pay them or to fund the pensions they had been promised during a long and
debilitating war. All of this led me, as a student of American civil-military relations, to ask why so loyal, subordinate, and successful a military, as professional
as any in the world, suddenly violated one of its most sacred traditions.
While open conflict soon dropped from public sight, bitterness hardened into a
visceral hatred that became part of the culture of many parts of the military establishment, kept alive by a continuous stream of incidents and controversies.3 These
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included, to cite but a few: the undermining and driving from office of Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin in 1993, followed by the humiliating withdrawal of his
nominated replacement; controversies over the retirements of at least six four-star
flag officers, including the early retirement of an Air Force chief of staff (an unprecedented occurrence); and the tragic suicide of a Chief of Naval Operations
(also unprecedented). There were ceaseless arguments over gender, the most
continuous source of conflict between the Clinton administration and its na4
tional security critics. The specific episodes ranged from the
botched investigations of the 1991 Tailhook scandal to the 1997
uproar over Air Force first lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the first female
B-52 line pilot, who (despite admitting to adultery, lying to an investigating officer, and disobeying orders) was allowed to leave the
service without court-martial. Other related incidents included
the outrages at Aberdeen Proving Ground, where Army sergeants
had sex with recruits under their command, and the 1999 retirement of the highest-ranking female Army general in history amid
accusations that she had been sexually harassed by a fellow general
officer some years previously. In addition, there were bitter arguments over readiness; over budgets; over whether and how to intervene with American forces abroad, from Somalia to Haiti to
5
Bosnia to Kosovo; and over national strategy generally.
So poisonous became the relationship that two Marine officers in 1998 had to
be reprimanded for violating article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the provision about contemptuous words against the highest civilian officials.
The assistant commandant of the Marine Corps felt constrained to warn all Marine generals about officers publicly criticizing or disparaging the commander
6
in chief. The next year, at a military ball at the Plaza Hotel in New York City, a local television news anchor, playing on the evening’s theme, “A Return to Integrity,” remarked that he “didn’t recognize any dearth of integrity here” until he
“realized that President Clinton was in town”—and the crowd, “which included
7
20 generals” and was made up largely of officers, went wild. During the election
of 2000, the chief legal officers of two of the largest commands in the Army and
Air Force issued warnings lest resentment over Gore campaign challenges to ab8
sentee ballots in Florida boil over into open contempt.
These illustrations emphasize the negatives. In contrast, by all accounts people in uniform respected and worked well with Secretary of Defense William
Perry. Certainly Generals John Shalikashvili and Hugh Shelton, successive chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after 1993, appeared to have been liked and respected by civilians in the Clinton administration. But these men, and other
senior officers and officials who bridged the two cultures at the top levels of

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2

4

Kohn: Thr Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United Sta
12

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

government, seemed to understand that theirs was a delicate role—to mediate
between two hostile relatives who feared and distrusted each other but realized
that they had to work together if both were to survive.
Now, to discount the Clinton difficulties as atmospherics and thus essentially insignificant would be mistaken, for the toxicity of the civil-military relationship
damaged national security in at least three ways: first, by paralyzing national security policy; second, by obstructing and in some cases sabotaging American
ability to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise leadership internationally; and
third, by undermining the confidence of the armed forces in their own uniformed leadership.
In response to that first, searing controversy over open homosexual service,
the administration concluded that this president—with his Democratic affiliation, liberal leanings, history of draft evasion and opposition to the Vietnam
War, and admitted marital infidelity and experimentation with mari9
juana—would never be acceptable to the military. One knowledgeable insider
characterized the White House of those years as reflecting the demography of
the post-Vietnam Democratic Party—people who had never served in uniform
and who had a “tin ear” for things military. Knowing little or nothing about military affairs or national security and not caring to develop a deep or sympathetic
understanding of either, the administration decided that for this president, mili10
tary matters constituted a “third rail.” No issue with the military was worth exposing this vulnerability; nothing was worth the cost. All controversy with the
military was therefore to be avoided. In fact, the Clintonites from the beginning
tried to “give away” the military establishment: first to the congressional Democrats, by making Les Aspin secretary of defense; then, when Aspin was driven
from office, to the military itself, by nominating Admiral Bobby Inman; then,
when he withdrew, to the military-industrial complex (with William Perry as
secretary and John Deutsch and John White as deputies), an arrangement that
lasted until 1997; and finally to the Republicans, in the person of Senator William Cohen of Maine. From the outset, the focus of the administration in foreign affairs was almost wholly economic in nature, and while that may have been
genius, one result of the Clintonites’ inattention and inconstancy was the disgust
and disrespect of the national security community, particularly those in uni11
form. By the time Clinton left office, some officials were admitting that he had
12
been “unwilling to exercise full authority over military commanders.” “Those
who monitored Clinton closely during his eight years as president believed . . .
that he was intimidated more by the military than by any other political force he
dealt with,” reported David Halberstam. Said “a former senior N[ational]
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S[ecurity] C[ouncil] official who studied [Clinton] closely, . . . ‘he was out-and-out
13
afraid of them.’”
Forging a reasonable and economical national security policy was crucial to
the health and well-being of the country, particularly at a time of epochal transition brought on by the end of the Cold War. But both the first Bush and then
Clinton’s administration studiously avoided any public discussion of what role
the United States should play in the world, unless asserting the existence of a
“new world order” or labeling the United States “the indispensable nation” con14
stitutes discussion. As for the Clinton administration, indifference to military
affairs and the decision to take no risks and expend no political capital in that
area produced paralysis. Any rethinking of strategy, force structure, roles and
missions of the armed services, organization, personnel, weapons, or other
choices indispensable for the near and long term was rendered futile. As a result,
today, over a decade after the end of the Cold War, there is still no common understanding about the fundamental purposes of the American military establishment or the principles by which the United States will decide whether to use
military power in pursuit of the national interest.
The Clinton administration held itself hostage to the organization and force
15
structure of the Cold War. At the beginning of Clinton’s first term, Secretary
Aspin attempted to modify the basis of American strategy—an ability to fight
two “major regional contingencies” (changed later to “major theater wars”) almost simultaneously. But Aspin caved in to charges that such a change would
embolden America’s adversaries and weaken security arrangements
16
with allies in the Middle East and Asia. The result was a defense
budget known to be inadequate for the size and configuration of the
military establishment even without the need to fund peacetime intervention contingencies, which constantly threw military accounts
17
into deficit. Budgets became prisoners of readiness. Forces could
not be reduced, because of the many military commitments around
the world, but if readiness to wage high-intensity combat fell or
seemed to diminish, Republican critics would rise up in outrage.
Thus the uniformed leadership—each service chief, regional or functional commander, sometimes even division, task force, or wing commanders—possessed the political weight to veto any significant
change in the nation’s fundamental security structure.
As a result, the Clinton administration never could match resources with
commitments, balance readiness with modernization, or consider organiza18
tional changes that would relieve the stresses on personnel and equipment. All
of this occurred when the services were on the brink of, or were actually undergoing, what many believed to be changes in weaponry and tactics so major as to
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19

Donald Rumsfeld
(Defenselink)

constitute a “revolution in military affairs.” One consequence of the insufficiency of resources in people and money to meet frequent operational commitments and growing maintenance costs was the loss of many of the best officers
and noncommissioned officers, just as economic prosperity and other factors
were reducing the numbers of men and women willing to sign up for military
service in the first place.
The paralysis in military policy in the 1990s provoked the Congress to attempt by legislation at least four different times to force the Pentagon to reevaluate national security policy, strategy, and force structure, with as yet no
20
significant result. Perhaps the last of these efforts, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (also called the Hart-Rudman Commission),
which undertook a comprehensive review of national security and the military
establishment, will have some effect. If so, it will be because the Bush administration possessed the political courage to brave the civil-military friction required to reorganize an essentially Cold War military establishment into a force
21
capable of meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century. But the
prospects are not encouraging when one considers Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s secrecy and lack of consultation with the
uniformed military and Congress; the forces gathering to resist change; the priority of the Bush tax cut
and national missile defense, which threaten to limit
severely the money available and to force excruciating choices; and Rumsfeld’s fudging of the very concept of “transformation.” Even the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks have not broken the logjam, except perhaps monetarily. The administration has
committed itself to slow, incremental change so as
not to confront the inherent conservatism of the
armed services or imperil the weapons purchases
pushed so powerfully by defense contractors and
22
their congressional champions. The White House
has done so despite its belief that the failure to exert
civilian control in the 1990s left a military establishment declining in quality and effectiveness.
Second, the Clinton administration—despite far more frequent occasions for
foreign armed intervention (which was ironic, considering its aversion to military matters)—was often immobilized over when, where, how, and under what
circumstances to use military force in the world. The long, agonizing debates
and vacillation over intervention in Africa, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia reflected in part the weakness of the administration compared to the political
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power of the uniformed military. The lack of trust between the two sides distorted decision making to an extreme. Sometimes the military exercised a veto
over the use of American force, or at least an ability so to shape the character of
American intervention that means determined ends—a roundabout way of exercising a veto. At other times, civilians ignored or even avoided receiving advice
from the military. By the 1999 Kosovo air campaign, the consultative relationship had so broken down that the president was virtually divorced from his theater commander, and that commander’s communications with the secretary of
defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs were corrupted by misunderstanding
and distrust. The result was a campaign misconceived at the outset and badly coordinated not only between civilian and military but between the various levels
of command. The consequences could have undone the Nato alliance, and they
certainly stiffened Serbian will, exacerbated divisions within Nato councils, increased criticism in the United States, and prolonged the campaign beyond what
24
almost everyone involved had predicted.
Last, the incessant acrimony—the venomous atmosphere in Washington—shook the confidence of the armed forces in their own leadership. Different groups accused the generals and admirals, at one extreme, of caving in to
political correctness, and at the other, of being rigid and hidebound with respect
to gender integration, war-fighting strategy, and organizational change. The impact on morale contributed to the hemorrhage from the profession of arms of
able young and middle-rank officers. The loss of so many fine officers, combined with declines in recruiting (which probably brought, in turn, a diminution in the quality of new officers and enlisted recruits), may weaken the nation’s
military leadership in the next generation and beyond, posing greater danger to
national security than would any policy blunder. Certainly many complex factors have driven people out of uniform and impaired recruiting, but the loss of
confidence in the senior uniformed leadership has been cited by many as a rea25
son to leave the service.
Now, to attribute all of these difficulties to the idiosyncrasies of the Clinton
administration alone would be a mistake. In fact, the recent friction in civilmilitary relations and unwillingness to exert civilian control have roots all the
way back to World War II. Unquestionably Mr. Clinton and his appointees bungled civil-military relations badly, from the beginning. But other administrations have done so also, and others will in the future.
If one measures civilian control not by the superficial standard of who signs
the papers and passes the laws but by the relative influence of the uniformed military and civilian policy makers in the two great areas of concern in military affairs—national security policy, and the use of force to protect the country and
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project power abroad—then civilian control has deteriorated significantly in the
last generation. In theory, civilians have the authority to issue virtually any order
and organize the military in any fashion they choose. But in practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree among themselves.
Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority by framing the
alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching
friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions,
or carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. The reality is that civilian control is not a fact but a process, measured across a spectrum—something
situational, dependent on the people, issues, and the political and military forces
involved. We are not talking about a coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the tune in military affairs in the United
26
States today.
Contrast the weakness of the civilian side with the strength of the military,
not only in the policy process but in clarity of definition of American purpose,
consistency of voice, and willingness to exert influence both in public and behind the scenes.
The power of the military within the policy process has been growing steadily
since a low point under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s.
Under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has influence that surpasses that of everyone
else within the Pentagon except the secretary of defense, and the chairman possesses a more competent, focused, and effective staff than the secretary does, as
well as, often, a clearer set of goals, fewer political constraints, and under some
27
circumstances greater credibility with the public. In the glow of success in the
Gulf War, efforts to exorcise Vietnam, the high public esteem now enjoyed by the
armed forces, and the disgust Americans have felt for politics in general and for
partisanship in particular, the stature of the chairman has grown to a magnitude
out of proportion to his legal or institutional position.
The Joint Staff is the most powerful organization in the Department of Defense; frequently, by dint of its speed, agility, knowledge, and expertise, the Joint
28
Staff frames the choices. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (the vice
chiefs, convening under the vice chairman to prioritize joint programs in terms
of need and cost) has gathered influence and authority over the most basic issues
29
of weapons and force structure. Within the bureaucracy, JCS has a representative in the interagency decision process, giving the uniformed military a
voice separate from that of the Department of Defense. Similarly, the armed
services maintain their own congressional liaison and public affairs offices,
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bureaucracies so large that they are impossible to monitor fully. (One officer admitted to me privately that his duty on Capitol Hill was to encourage Congress
to restore a billion dollars that the Pentagon’s civilian leadership had cut out of
30
his service’s budget request.) Moreover, the regional commanders have come
to assume such importance in their areas—particularly in the Pacific, the Middle East, and Central Asia—that they have effectively displaced American ambassadors and the State Department as the primary instruments of American
31
foreign policy. In recent reorganizations, these commanders have so increased
in stature and influence within the defense establishment that their testimony
can sway Congress and embarrass or impede the administration, especially
when the civilians in the executive branch are weak and the Congress is dominated by an aggressively led opposition political party.
One knowledgeable commentator put it this way in early 1999: “The dirty little secret of American civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [the
Clinton] administration, is that the commander in chief does not command the
military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, ap32
peases it.” A high Pentagon civilian privately substantiates the interpretation:
what “weighs heavily . . . every day” is “the reluctance, indeed refusal, of the political appointees to disagree with the military on any matter, not just operational matters.” In fact, so powerful have such institutional forces become, and
so intractable the problem of altering the military establishment, that the new
Rumsfeld regime in the Pentagon decided to conduct its comprehensive review
of national defense in strict secrecy, effectively cutting the regional commanders, the service chiefs, and the Congress out of the process so that resistance
33
could not organize in advance of the intended effort at transformation.
Furthermore, senior military leaders have been able to use their personal leverage for a variety of purposes, sometimes because of civilian indifference, or
deference, or ignorance, sometimes because they have felt it necessary to fill
voids of policy and decision making. But sometimes the influence is exercised
intentionally and purposefully, even aggressively. After fifty years of cold war,
the “leak,” the bureaucratic maneuver, the alliance with partisans in Congress—the ménage à trois between the administration, Congress, and the military—have become a way of life, in which services and groups employ their
knowledge, contacts, and positions to promote personal or institutional agen34
das. In the 1970s, responding to the view widely held among military officers
that a reserve callup would have galvanized public support for Vietnam, allowed
intensified prosecution of the war, and prevented divorce between the Army and
the American people, the Army chief of staff deliberately redesigned divisions to
contain “round-out” units of reserve or National Guard troops, making it impossible for the president to commit the Army to battle on a large scale without
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35

mobilizing the reserves and Guard. In the 1980s, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Admiral William J. Crowe, worked “behind the scenes” to encourage
Congress to strengthen his own office even though the secretary of defense opposed such a move. During the Iran-Iraq War Crowe pushed for American escort of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, because he believed it important for
American foreign policy. He and the chiefs strove to slow the Reagan administration’s strategic missile defense program. Crowe even went so far as to create a
personal communications channel with his Soviet military counterpart, apparently unknown to his civilian superiors, to avert any possibility of a misunderstanding leading to war. “It was in the nature of the Chairman’s job,” Crowe
remembered, “that I occasionally found myself fighting against
Defense Department positions as well as for them.”36
In the 1990s, press leaks from military sources led directly to
the weakening and ultimate dismissal of the Clinton administra37
tion’s first secretary of defense. In 1994 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) openly discussed with senior commanders his
plans to manipulate the Navy budget and operations tempo to
force his preferred priorities on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress. When a memo recounting the conversation
William J. Crowe
surfaced in the press, no civilian in authority called the CNO to
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md.
38
account. The 1995 Commission on the Roles and Missions of
the Armed Forces recommended consolidating the staffs of the service chiefs
and the service secretaries; no one mentioned the diminution of civilian control
39
that would have taken place as a result.
Even during the 1990s, a period when the administration appeared to be
forceful, insisting upon the use of American forces over military objections or
resistance, the uniformed leadership often arbitrated events. The 1995 Bosnia
intervention was something of a paradigm. American priorities seem to have
been, first, deploying in overwhelming strength, in order to suffer few if any casualties; second, establishing a deadline for exit; third, issuing “robust” rules of
engagement, again to forestall casualties; fourth, narrowing the definition of the
mission to ensure that it was incontrovertibly “doable”; and fifth—fifth—recon40
structing Bosnia as a viable independent country.
In recent years senior uniformed leaders have spoken out on issues of policy—
undoubtedly often with the encouragement or at least the acquiescence of civilian officials, but not always so. Sometimes these pronouncements endeavor to
sell policies and decisions to the public or within the government before a presidential decision, even though such advocacy politicizes the chairman, a chief, or
a regional commander and inflates their influence in discussions of policy. A
four-star general, a scant ten days after retiring, publishes a long article in our
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most respected foreign affairs journal, preceded by a New York Times op-ed
piece. In them, he criticizes the administration’s most sensitive (and vulnerable)
policy—and virtually no one in the press or elsewhere questions whether his ac41
tion was professionally appropriate. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
gives “an impassioned interview” to the New York Times “on the folly of intervention” in Bosnia as “the first Bush administration” is pondering “the question
42
of whether to intervene.” Another chairman coins the “Dover Principle,” cautioning the civilian leadership about the human and political costs of casualties
when American forces are sent into some crisis or conflict (and service members’ bodies return through the joint mortuary at Dover Air Force Base). This
lecture clearly aimed to establish boundaries in the public’s mind and to constrain civilian freedom of action in intervening overseas.
Certainly Generals Shalikashvili and Shelton have been fairly circumspect
about speaking out on issues of policy, and the current chairman, Air Force general Richard B. Myers, even more. However, their predecessor, Colin Powell, possessed and used extraordinary power throughout his tenure as chairman of the
JCS. He conceived and then sold to a skeptical secretary of defense and a divided
Congress the “Base Force” reorganization and reduction in 1990–91. He shaped
the U.S. prosecution of the Gulf War to ensure limited objectives, the use of
overwhelming force, a speedy end to combat, and the immediate exit of American forces. He spoke frequently on matters of policy during and after the election of 1992—an op-ed in the New York Times and a more comprehensive
statement of foreign policy in the quarterly Foreign Affairs. Powell essentially vetoed intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, ignored or circumvented the chiefs on
a regular basis, and managed the advisory process so as to present only single alternatives to civilian policy makers. All of this antedated his forcing President
43
Clinton in 1993 to back down on allowing homosexuals to serve openly. In fact,
General Powell became so powerful and so adept in the bureaucratic manipulations
that often decide crucial questions before the final decision maker affixes a signature
that in 2001 the Bush administration installed an experienced, powerful, highly respected figure at the Defense Department specifically lest Powell control the entire
44
foreign and national security apparatus in the new administration.
All of these are examples—and only public manifestations—of a policy and
decision-making process that has tilted far more toward the military than ever
before in American history in peacetime.
Now an essential question arises: do these developments differ from previous
practice or experience in American history? At first glance, the answer might
seem to be no. Military and civilian have often differed, and the military has for
many years acted on occasion beyond what might be thought proper in a
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republican system of government, a system that defines civilian control, or military subordination to civil authority, as obligatory.
Historical examples abound. Leading generals and chiefs of staff of the Army
from James Wilkinson in the 1790s through Maxwell Taylor in the 1950s have
fought with presidents and secretaries of war or defense in the open and in private over all sorts of issues—including key military policies in times of crisis. Officers openly disparaged Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War; that president’s
45
problems with his generals became legendary. Two commanding generals of
the Army were so antagonistic toward the War Department that they moved
their headquarters out of Washington: Winfield Scott to New York in the 1850s,
46
and William Tecumseh Sherman to St. Louis in the 1870s. In the 1880s, reformminded naval officers connived to modernize the Navy from wood and sail to
steel and steam. To do so they drew the civilian leadership into the process,
forged an alliance with the steel industry, and (for the first time in American history, and in coordination with political and economic elites) sold naval reform
and a peacetime buildup of standing forces to the public through publications,
presentations, displays, reviews, and other precursors of the promotional public
relations that would be used so frequently—and effectively—in the twentieth
47
century. In the 1920s and 1930s, the youthful Army Air Corps became so adept
at public relations and at generating controversy over airpower that three different
presidential administrations were forced to appoint high-level boards of outsiders
48
to study how the Army could (or could not) properly incorporate aviation.
Both Presidents Roosevelt complained bitterly about the resistance of the
armed services to change. “You should go through the experience of trying to get
any changes in the thinking . . . and action of the career diplomats and then you’d
know what a real problem was,” FDR complained in 1940. “But the Treasury and
the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy. . . .
To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it
with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted,
49
and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.”
The interservice battles of the 1940s and 1950s were so fierce that neither
Congress nor the president could contain them. Internecine warfare blocked
President Harry Truman’s effort to unify the armed forces in the 1940s (“unification” finally produced only loose confederation) and angered President
Dwight D. Eisenhower through the 1950s. Neither administration fully controlled strategy, force structure, or weapons procurement; both had to fight service parochialism and interests; and both ruled largely by imposing top-line
budget limits and forcing the services to struggle over a limited funding “pie.”
Eisenhower replaced or threatened to fire several of his chiefs. Only through
Byzantine maneuvers, managerial wizardry, and draconian measures did Robert
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McNamara bring a modicum of coherence and integration to the overall administration of the Defense Department in the 1960s. The price, however, was a
ruthless, relentless bureaucratic struggle that not only contributed to the disaster
of Vietnam but left a legacy of suspicion and deceit that infects American
50
civil-military relations to this day. (Even today, embittered officers identify their
nemesis by his full name—Robert Strange McNamara—to express their loathing.) The point of this history is that civil-military relations are messy and frequently antagonistic; military
people do on occasion defy civilians; civilian control is
51
situational.
But the present differs from the past in four crucial
ways.
First, the military has now largely united to shape,
oppose, evade, or thwart civilian choices, whereas in the
past the armed services were usually divided internally
or among themselves. Indeed, most civil-military conflict during the Cold War arose from rivalry between
the services, and over roles, missions, budgets, or new
weapons systems—not whether and how to use American armed forces, or general military policy.
Second, many of the issues in play today reach far beyond the narrowly military, not only to the wider realm
of national security but often to foreign relations more
broadly. In certain cases military affairs even affect the
character and values of American society itself.
Third, the role of military leaders has drifted over the last generation from
that primarily of advisers and advocates within the private confines of the executive branch to a much more public function. As we have noted, they champion
not just their services but policies and decisions in and beyond the military
realm, and sometimes they mobilize public or congressional opinion either directly or indirectly (whether in Congress or the executive branch) prior to decision by civilian officials. To give but three examples: senior officers spoke out
publicly on whether the United States should sign a treaty banning the use of
land mines; on whether American forces should be put into the Balkans to stop
ethnic cleansing; and on whether the nation should support the establishment
of the International Criminal Court. Again, such actions are not unprecedented,
but they have occurred recently with increasing frequency, and collectively they
52
represent a significant encroachment on civilian control of the military.
Fourth, senior officers now lead a permanent peacetime military establishment that differs fundamentally from any of its predecessors. Unlike the large
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citizen forces raised in wartime and during the Cold War, today’s armed services
are professional and increasingly disconnected, even in some ways estranged,
from civilian society. Yet in comparison to previous peacetime professional
forces, which were also isolated from civilian culture, today’s are far larger, far
more involved worldwide, far more capable, and often indispensable (even on a
daily basis) to American foreign policy and world politics. Five decades of warfare and struggle against communism, moreover, have created something entirely new in American history—a separate military community, led by the
regular forces but including also the National Guard and reserves, veterans organizations, and the communities, labor sectors, industries, and pressure groups
active in military affairs. More diverse than the “military-industrial complex” of
President Eisenhower’s farewell address forty years ago, this “military” has become a recognizable interest group. Also, it is larger, more bureaucratically active, more political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than
anything similar in American history.53
One might argue that this is all temporary, the unique residue of sixty years of
world and cold war, and that it will dissipate and balance will return now that the
Clinton administration is history. Perhaps—but civil-military conflict is not
very likely to diminish. In “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” Donald Rumsfeld states that his
primary function is “to exercise civilian control over the Department for the
Commander-in-Chief and the country.” He understands that he possesses “the
right to get into anything and exercise it [i.e., civilian control].” He recognizes as
a rule, “When cutting staff at the Pentagon, don’t eliminate the thin layer that as54
sures civilian control.” Nonetheless, his effort to recast the military establishment for the post–Cold War era—as promised during the 2000 presidential
campaign—provoked such immediate and powerful resistance (and not just by
the armed forces) that he abandoned any plans to force reorganization or cut
55
“legacy” weapons systems. In the Afghanistan campaign, Rumsfeld and other
civilian leaders have reportedly been frustrated by an apparent lack of imagination on the part of the military; in return, at least one four-star has accused
56
Rumsfeld of “micromanagement.” There is also other evidence of conflict to
come; traditional conceptions of military professionalism—particularly the
ethical and professional norms of the officer corps—have been evolving away
from concepts and behaviors that facilitate civil-military cooperation.
If the manifestations of diminished civilian control were simply a sine
curve—that is, a low period in a recurring pattern—or the coincidence of a
strong Joint Chiefs and a weak president during a critical transitional period in
American history and national defense (the end of the Cold War), there would
be little cause for concern. Civilian control, as we have seen, is situational and
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indeed to a degree cyclical. But the present decline extends back before the
Clinton administration. There are indications that the current trend began before the Vietnam War and has since been aggravated by a weakening of the nation’s social, political, and institutional structures that had, over the course of
American history, assured civilian control.
For more than two centuries, civilian control has rested on four foundations
that individually and in combination not only prevented any direct military
threat to civilian government but kept military influence, even in wartime,
largely contained within the boundaries of professional expertise and concerns.
First has been the rule of law, and with it reverence for a constitution that provided explicitly for civilian control of the military. Any violation of the Constitution or its process has been sure to bring retribution from one or all three of
the branches of government, with public support. Second, Americans once kept
their regular forces small. The United States relied in peacetime on ocean
boundaries to provide sufficient warning of attack and depended on a policy of
mobilization to repel invasion or to wage war. Thus the regular military could
never endanger civilian government—in peacetime because of its size, and in
wartime because the ranks were filled with citizens unlikely to cooperate or acquiesce in anything illegal or unconstitutional. The very reliance on citizen soldiers—militia, volunteers, and conscripts pressed temporarily into service to
meet an emergency—was a third safeguard of civilian control. Finally, the armed
forces themselves internalized military subordination to civil authority. They
accepted it willingly as an axiom of American government and the foundation
of military professionalism. “You must remember that when we enter the army
we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward the government,
entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances,” Major
General John J. Pershing instructed First Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., in
1916. “We are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to
do so or else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the
57
complete understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.” As
Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, “Thirty-two
years in the peacetime army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and
58
keep my name out of the papers.”
Much has changed. More than sixty years of hot and cold war, a large military
establishment, world responsibilities, a searing failure in Vietnam, and changes
in American society, among other factors, have weakened these four foundations upon which civilian control has rested in the United States.
The first, and most troubling, development is the skepticism, even cynicism,
now expressed about government, lawyers, and justice, part of a broad and generation-long diminution of respect for people and institutions that has eroded
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American civic culture and faith in law. Polling data show that Americans today
have the most confidence in their least democratic institutions: the military,
small business, the police, and the Supreme Court. Americans express the least
59
confidence in the most democratic: Congress. So dangerous is this trend that
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government established a “Visions of Governance
for the Twenty-first Century” project to explore the phenomenon, study its impli60
cations, and attempt to counteract some of its more deleterious effects. Americans cannot continue to vilify government, the U.S. government in particular, and
expect patriotism to prosper or even survive as a fundamental civic value.
Second, the media, traditionally the herald of liberty in this society, has become less substantial, more superficial, less knowledgeable, more focused on
profit, less professional, and more trivial. About the only liberty the media seems
to champion vocally is the freedom of the press. Issues of civilian control seem to
escape the press; time after time, events or issues that in past years would have
been framed or interpreted as touching upon civilian control now go unnoticed
61
and unreported, at least in those terms.
Third, the nation’s core civic culture has deteriorated. Such basic social institutions as marriage and the family, and such indicators of society’s health as
crime rates and out-of-wedlock births, while stabilizing or improving in the
1990s, clearly have weakened over time. Our communities, neighborhoods, civic
organizations, fraternal groups, and social gatherings have diminished in favor
of individual entertainment; people are staying at home with cable television,
the videocassette recorder, and the Internet, thereby avoiding crime, crowds,
traffic, and the crumbling physical and social infrastructure of our society.
American society has become more splintered and people more isolated into
small groups, “clustered” geographically and demographically around similar
values, culture, and lifestyles. With this deterioration of civic cohesion—gated
communities being perhaps emblematic—has come a weakening of shared values: less truthfulness, less generosity, less sacrifice, less social consciousness, less
faith, less common agreement on ethical behavior, and more advocacy, acrimony, individualism, relativism, materialism, cynicism, and self-gratification.
The 11 September attacks and the war on terrorism are unlikely to reverse these
trends as long as the national leadership exhorts the American people to go back
62
to “normal.”
Civilian control is one common understanding that seems to have faded in
American civic consciousness. The American people—whose study and understanding of civics and government generally have declined—have lost their traditional skepticism about the professional military that made civilian control a
core political assumption, one that was widely understood and periodically
voiced. Simply put, the public no longer thinks about civilian control—does not
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understand it, does not discuss it, and does not grasp how it can and should op63
erate. An occasional popular movie like The Siege and Thirteen Days raises the
issue, but most recent films caricature the military or, like GI Jane and Rules of
Engagement, lionize an honest, brave, faithful military and demonize lying, ava64
ricious politicians.
Fourth, in the last generation the United States has abandoned the first principle of civilian control, the bedrock practice extending back into premodern
65
England—reliance on the citizen soldier for national defense. National security policy no longer seriously envisions mobilizing industry and the population
for large-scale war. Americans in uniform, whether they serve for one hitch or an
entire career, are taught to (and do) view themselves as professionals. In the National Guard and reserves, whose members are thought to be the apotheosis of citizen soldiers, some hold civilian government jobs in their units or elsewhere in the
government national security community, and others serve on active duty consid66
erably more than the traditional one weekend a month and two weeks a year.
Furthermore, while Guardsmen and reservists both voice and believe the traditional rhetoric about citizen-soldiering, the views of their up-and-coming of67
ficers mirror almost exactly those of their regular counterparts. Reserve forces
are spending more and more time on active duty, not simply for temporary duty
for the present crisis of homeland defense. Increasingly, the National Guard and
reserves are being used interchangeably with the regulars, even in overseas de68
ployments on constabulary missions, something wholly unprecedented. Even
if they call themselves citizen soldiers, the fundamental distinction between citizens and soldiers has so blurred that in 1998, at two of the most respected U.S.
institutions of professional military education, Marine majors who had spent
their adult lives in uniform and National Guard adjutant generals who had done
69
the same could both insist that they were “citizen soldiers.” Americans have
lost the high regard they once possessed for temporary military service as an obligation of citizenship, along with their former understanding of its underlying
70
contribution to civic cohesion and civilian control of the military.
Today, fewer Americans serve or know people who do, and the numbers will
71
decline as smaller percentages of the population serve in uniform. Their sense
of ownership of or interest in the military, and their understanding of the distinctiveness of military culture—its ethos and needs—have declined. In recent
years the number of veterans serving in the U.S. Congress has fallen 50 percent,
and the remaining veterans constitute a smaller percentage of the members of
Congress than veterans do of the population as a whole, reversing (in 1995) a
72
pattern that had endured since the turn of the century. The effect is dramatic;
less than ten years ago, 62 percent of the Senate and 41 percent of the House were
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veterans. Today in the 107th Congress, the figure for the Senate is 38 percent, and
73
for the House, 29 percent.
Finally, at the same time that civilian control has weakened in the awareness
of the public, so too has the principle declined in the consciousness and professional understanding of the American armed forces. Historically, one of the
chief bulwarks of civilian control has been the American military establishment
itself. Its small size in peacetime, the professionalism of the officers, their political neutrality, their willing subordination, and their acceptance of a set of unwritten but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military
relationship—all had made civilian control succeed, messy as it sometimes was
and situational as it must always be. In the last half-century, however, while everyone in the armed forces has continued to support the concept, the ethos and
mentalité of the officer corps have changed in ways that damage civil-military
cooperation and undermine civilian control.
Reversing a century and a half of practice, the American officer corps has become partisan in political affiliation, and overwhelmingly Republican. Beginning with President Richard Nixon’s politics of polarization—the “southern
strategy” and reaching out to the “hard-hats”—Republicans embraced traditional patriotism and strong national defense as central parts of their national
agenda. During the late 1970s—years of lean defense budgets and the “hollow
force”—and in the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan made rebuilding the armed
forces and taking the offensive in the Cold War centerpieces of his presidency,
Republicans reached out to the military as a core constituency. They succeeded
in part because, in the wake of Vietnam, the Democratic Party virtually abandoned the military, offering antimilitary rhetoric and espousing reduced defense spending. During the same period, voting in elections began to become a
habit in the officer corps. In the 1950s, the Federal Voting Assistance Program
came into existence in order to help enlisted men, most of whom were draftees
or draft-induced volunteers, to vote. In every unit an officer was designated to
connect the program to the men, and undoubtedly the task began to break down
slowly what had been something of a taboo against officers exercising their franchise. How (the logic must have been) could officers encourage their soldiers to
74
vote if they themselves abstained?
Today the vast majority of officers not only vote but identify with a political
philosophy and party. Comparison of a sample by the Triangle Institute of Security Studies of active-duty officers (see endnote 25) with earlier data shows a
shift from over 54 percent independent, “no preference,” or “other” in a 1976
survey to 28 percent in 1998–99, and from 33 percent to 64 percent Republican
today.75 In the presidential election of 2000, Republicans targeted military voters
by organizing endorsements from retired flag officers, advertising in military

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

19

Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 2
KOHN

27

publications, using Gulf War heroes Colin Powell and H. Norman Schwarzkopf
on the campaign trail, urging service members to register and vote, and focusing
special effort on absentee military voters—a group that proved critical, perhaps
the margin of victory, in Florida, where thousands of armed forces personnel
76
maintain their legal residency.
Before the present generation, American military officers (since before the
Civil War) had abstained as a group from party politics, studiously avoiding any
partisanship of word or deed, activity, or affiliation. By George C. Marshall’s
77
time, the practice was not even to vote. A handful of the most senior officers
pursued political ambitions, usually trying to parlay wartime success into the
presidency. A very few even ran for office while on active duty. But these were exceptions. The belief was that the military, as the neutral servant of the state,
stood above the dirty business of politics. Professional norms dictated faith and
loyalty not just in deed but in spirit to whoever held the reins of power under the
constitutional system. For Marshall’s generation, partisan affiliation and voting
78
conflicted with military professionalism.
Marshall and his fellow officers must have sensed that the habit of voting leads
to partisan thinking, inclining officers to become invested in particular policy
79
choices or decisions that relate directly to their professional responsibilities. Officers at every level have to bring difficult and sometimes unpopular duties to their
troops and motivate the latter to carry them out. Likewise, senior officers must
represent the needs and perspectives of the troops to political leaders even when
they are unsolicited or unwanted. How effective can that advice be if the civilians know the officers are opposed to a
policy in question? What are the effects on morale when the
troops know their officers dislike, disrespect, or disagree
with the politicians, or think a mission is unwise, ill conceived, or unnecessary?
The consequences of partisanship can also be more subtle and indirect but equally far-reaching, even to the point
of contempt for civilian policy and politicians or of unprofessional, disruptive behavior, as in 1993. The belief is current today among officers that the core of the Democratic
Party is “hostile to military culture” and engaged in a “culture war” against the armed forces, mostly because of pressure for further gender integration and open homosexual
80
service. During the 2000 election campaign, when Al Gore
stumbled briefly by supporting a “litmus test” on gays in
the military for selecting members of the Joint Chiefs, he
George C. Marshall
confirmed for many in uniform the idea that Democrats do
(G.C. Marshall Foundation)
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not understand the military profession or care about its effectiveness. His campaign’s effort to minimize the effect of absentee votes in Florida and elsewhere
through technical challenges outraged the armed forces, raising worries that a
Gore victory might spark an exodus from the ranks or that a Gore administra81
tion would have relations with the military even more troubled than Clinton’s.
Partisan politicization loosens the connection of the military to the American people. If the public begins to perceive the military as an interest group
driven by its own needs and agenda, support—and trust—will diminish. Already there are hints. When a random survey asked a thousand Americans in the
fall of 1998 how often military leaders would try to avoid carrying out orders
82
they opposed, over two-thirds answered at least “some of the time.”
Partisanship also poisons the relationship between the president and the uniformed leadership. When a group of retired flag officers, including former regional commanders and members of the Joint Chiefs, endorsed presidential
candidates in 1992 and again in 2000, they broadcast their politicization to the
public and further legitimated partisanship in the ranks—for everyone knows
that four-stars never really retire. Like princes of the church, they represent the
culture and the profession just as authoritatively as their counterparts on active
duty. If senior retired officers make a practice of endorsing presidential contenders, will the politicians trust the generals and admirals on active duty, in
particular those who serve at the top, to have the loyalty and discretion not to retire and use their inside knowledge to try to overturn policies or elect opponents? Will not presidents begin to vet candidates for the top jobs for their
pliability or (equally deleteriously) their party or political views, rather than for
excellence, achievement, character, and candor? Over time, the result will be
weak military advice, declining military effectiveness, and accelerating
politicization.
The investment of officers in one policy or another will lead civilians to question whether military recommendations are the best professional advice of the
nation’s military experts. Perhaps one reason Bill Clinton and his people dealt
with the military at arm’s length was that he and they knew that officers were the
83
most solidly Republican group in the government. One need only read Richard
Holbrooke’s memoir about negotiating the Dayton accords in 1995 to plumb
the depth of suspicion between military and civilian at the highest levels. Convinced that the military opposed the limited bombing campaign against the
Bosnian Serbs, Holbrooke and Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed
that the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs was lying to them when he asserted
84
that the Air Force was running out of targets.
Certainly officers have the right to vote and to participate privately in the nation’s political life. No one questions the legal entitlement of retired officers to
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run for office or endorse candidates. But these officers must recognize the corrosive effects on military professionalism and the threat to the military establishment’s relationship with Congress, the executive branch, and the American
people that such partisan behavior has. Possessing a right and exercising it are
two very different things.
A second example of changing military professionalism has been the widespread attitude among officers that civilian society has become corrupt, even degenerate, while the military has remained a repository for virtue, perhaps its one
remaining bastion, in an increasingly unraveling social fabric, of the traditional
values that make the country strong. Historically, officers have often decried the
selfishness, commercialism, and disorder that seems to characterize much of
85
American society. But that opinion today has taken on a harder, more critical,
more moralistic edge; it is less leavened by that sense of acceptance that enabled
officers in the past to tolerate the clash between their values and those of a democratic, individualistic civilian culture and to reconcile the conflict with their
own continued service.
Nearly 90 percent of the elite military officers (regular and reserves) surveyed
in 1998–99 by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies agreed that “the decline
of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society.” Some 70
percent thought that “through leading by example, the military could help
American society become more moral,” and 75 percent believed that “civilian
society would be better off if it adopted more of the military’s values and cus86
toms.” Is it healthy for civilian control when the members of the American
armed forces believe that they are morally, organizationally, institutionally, and
personally superior to the rest of society—and are contemptuous of that society? Do we wish civic society in a democratic country to adopt military norms,
values, outlooks, and behaviors? In my judgment that is an utter misreading of
the role and function of our armed forces. Their purpose is to defend society, not
to define it. The latter is militarism, in the classic definition—the same thinking
that in part inclined the French and German armies to intervene in the politics
of their nations in the twentieth century.
A third, and most disturbing, change in military sentiment is the belief that
officers should confront and resist civilians whose policies or decisions they believe threaten to weaken national defense or lead the country into disaster. Many
hold that officers should speak out publicly, or work behind the scenes, to stop
or modify a policy, or resign in protest. Some senior leaders have been willing to
speak publicly on issues of national security, foreign relations, and military policy before it is formulated, and afterward as spokespersons for what are often
highly controversial and partisan initiatives or programs. In 1998 and 1999, the
respected retired Army colonel and political scientist Sam Sarkesian, and the
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much-decorated Marine veteran, novelist, and former secretary of the Navy
James Webb, called publicly for military leaders to participate in national security policy debates, not merely as advisers to the civilian leadership but as public
87
advocates, an idea that seems to resonate with many in the armed forces today.
“Military subservience to political control applies to existing policy, not to policy debates,” admonished Webb—as if officers can subscribe to policy and de88
bate it honestly at the same time. Such behavior politicizes military issues and
professional officers directly, for rare is the military issue that remains insulated
from politics and broader national life.
This willingness—indeed, in some cases eagerness—to strive to shape public
opinion and thereby affect decisions and policy outcomes is a dangerous development for the U.S. military and is extraordinarily corrosive of civilian control.
Is it proper for military officers to leak information to the press “to discredit specific policies—procurement decisions, prioritization plans, operations that the
leaker opposes,” as Admiral Crowe in his memoirs admits happens “sometimes,”
89
even “copiously”? Is it proper for the four services, the regional commanders,
or the Joint Chiefs every year to advocate to the public directly their needs for
ships, airplanes, divisions, troops, and other resources, or their views on what
percentage of the nation’s economy should go to defense as opposed to other
90
priorities? This advocacy reached such a cacophony in the fall of 2000 that the
secretary of defense warned the military leadership not “to beat the drum with a
tin cup” for their budgets during the presidential campaign and the transition to
91
a new administration.
Do we wish the military leadership to argue the merits of intervention in the
Balkans or elsewhere, of whether to sign treaties on land-mine use or war
crimes, in order to mobilize public opinion one way or the other, before the president decides? Imagine that we are back in 1941. Should the Army and the Navy
pronounce publicly on the merits or demerits of Lend-Lease, or convoy escort,
or the occupation of Iceland, or the Europe-first strategy? Or imagine it is
1861—should the nation’s military leaders publicly discuss whether to reinforce
Fort Sumter? Would it be advisable for senior officers to proclaim openly their
varied opinions of whether the South’s secession ought to (or can) be opposed
by plunging the country into civil war? Should senior military officers question
the president’s strategy in the midst of a military operation, as was done in 1999
92
through media leaks in the first week of the bombing campaign over Kosovo?
In such instances, what happens to the president’s, and Congress’s, authority
and credibility with the public, and to their ability to lead the nation? How does
such advocacy affect the trust and confidence between the president, his cabinet
officers, and the most senior generals and admirals, trust and confidence that is
93
so necessary for effective national defense?
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The way in which military officers have interpreted a study of the role of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision on intervention and in the formulation of
strategy for Southeast Asia in 1963–65 exemplifies the erosion of professional
norms and values. H. R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam is by all accounts the history book most widely read and discussed in the military in the
94
last several years. Officers believe that McMaster validates long-standing military convictions about Vietnam—that the Joint Chiefs, lacking a proper understanding of their role and not having the courage to oppose the Johnson
administration’s strategy of gradualism that they knew would fail, should have
voiced their opposition, publicly if necessary, and resigned rather than carry out
that strategy. Had they done so, goes this credo, they would have saved the coun95
try a tragic, costly, humiliating, and above all, unnecessary, defeat.
McMaster’s book neither says nor implies that the chiefs should have obstructed U.S. policy in Vietnam in any other way than by presenting their views
frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors, and speaking honestly to the
Congress when asked for their views. It neither states nor suggests that the chiefs
should have opposed President Lyndon Johnson’s orders and policies by leaks,
public statements, or by resignations, unless an officer personally and professionally could not stand, morally and ethically, to carry out the chosen policy.
There is in fact no tradition of resignation in the American military. In 1783, at
Newburgh, New York, as the war for independence was ending, the American officer corps rejected individual or mass resignation—which can be indistinguishable from mutiny.
George Washington persuaded them not to march on
Congress or refuse orders in response to congressional
unwillingness to pay them or guarantee their
hard-earned pensions. The precedent has survived for
more than two centuries. No American army ever
again considered open insubordination.
Proper professional behavior cannot include simply walking away from a policy, an operation, or a war
an officer believes is wrong or will fail. That is what the
Left advocated during the Vietnam War, and the
American military rightly rejected it. Imagine the consequences if the Union army had decided in late 1862
that it had signed on to save the Union but not to free
the slaves and had resigned en masse because of disagreement (which was extensive) with the Emancipation Proclamation. More recently, Air Force chief of
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staff Ronald Fogleman did not resign in protest in 1997, as many officers wish to
believe; he requested early retirement and left in such a manner—quietly, without a full explanation—precisely so as not to confront his civilian superior over a
96
decision with which he deeply disagreed. All McMaster says (and believes), and
all that is proper in the American system, is that military officers should advise
honestly and forthrightly, or advocate in a confidential capacity, a course of action. Whether their advice is heeded or not, if the policy or decision is legal, they
are to carry it out.
Resignation in protest directly assails civilian control. Issuing a public explanation for resignation, however diplomatically couched, amounts to marshaling
all of an officer’s military knowledge, expertise, and experience—as well as the
profession’s standing with the public and reputation for disinterested patriotism—to undercut some undertaking or concept that the officer opposes. The
fact that officers today either ignore or are oblivious to this basic aspect of their
professional ethics and would countenance, even admire, such truculent behavior illustrates both a fundamental misunderstanding of civilian control and its
weakening as a primary professional value.97
Our military leaders have already traveled far in the direction of self-interested
bureaucratic behavior in the last half-century, to become advocates for policy
outcomes as opposed to advisers—presenting not only the military perspective
on a problem, or the needs of the military establishment and national defense, or
the interests of their services or branches, but their own views of foreign and
military policy—even, as we have seen, pressing these efforts outside the normal
advisory channels. Some of this is unthinking, some the product of civilian abrogation of responsibility, and some is the unintended consequence of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which so strengthened the chairman and the regional
commanders. But let us be clear: some is quite conscious. In his memoirs, Colin
Powell, the most celebrated soldier of the era, wrote that he learned as a White
House Fellow, from his most important mentor, that in the government “you
98
never know what you can get away with until you try.” Is that a proper standard
of professional behavior for a uniformed officer? He also declared that his generation of officers “vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not
quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the Ameri99
can people could not understand or support.” Is that a proper view of military
subordination to civilian authority?
Unfortunately, General Powell’s views mirror attitudes that have become
widespread over the last generation. The survey of officer and civilian attitudes
and opinions undertaken by the Triangle Institute in 1998–99 discovered that
many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian
decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American
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forces abroad. When “asked whether . . . military leaders should be neutral, advise, advocate, or insist on having their way in . . . the decision process” to use
military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming active-duty officers answered “insist,” on the following issues: “setting rules of engagement, ensuring
that clear political and military goals exist . . . , developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and
100
“deciding what kinds of military units . . . will be used to accomplish all tasks.”
In the context of the questionnaire, “insist” definitely implied that officers
should try to compel acceptance of the military’s recommendations.
In 2000, a three-star general casually referred to a uniformed culture in the Pentagon that labels the Office of the Secretary of Defense as “the enemy”—because it
exercises civilian control.101 In 1999, staff officers of the National Security Council deliberately attempted to promulgate a new version of the national security
strategy quickly enough to prevent the president from enunciating his own prin102
ciples first. In 1997 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs urged the chiefs to block
Congress’s effort to reform the military establishment through the Quadrennial
103
Defense Review. In the early 1990s, senior officers presented alternatives for
the use of American forces abroad specifically designed to discourage the civil104
ian leadership from intervening in the first place. Twice in the past five years
members of the Joint Chiefs have threatened to resign as a means of blocking a
105
policy or decision.
Thus, in the last generation, the American military has slipped from conceiving of its primary role as advice to civilians followed by execution of their orders,
to trying—as something proper, even essential in some situations—to impose
its viewpoint on policies or decisions. In other words, American officers have,
over the course of the Cold War and in reaction to certain aspects of it, forgotten
or abandoned their historical stewardship of civilian control, their awareness of
the requirement to maintain it, and their understanding of the proper boundaries and behaviors that made it work properly and effectively. That so many
voices applaud this behavior or sanction it by their silence suggests that a new
definition of military professionalism may be forming, at least in civil-military
relations. If so, the consequences are not likely to benefit national security; they
could alter the character of American government itself.
Even military readers who accept my presentation of facts may find my concerns
overblown. Certainly, there is no crisis. The American military conceives of itself
as loyal and patriotic; it universally expresses support for civilian control as a
fundamental principle of government and of military professionalism. Yet at the
same time, the evidence is overwhelming that civil-military relationships have
deteriorated in the U.S. government. The underlying structures of civilian society and the military profession that traditionally supported the system of
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civilian control have weakened. Over the course of the last generation, much influence and actual power has migrated to the military, which has either been allowed to define, or has itself claimed, an expanded role in foreign policy and
106
national security decision making. The reasons are complex—partly circumstance, partly civilian inattention or politically motivated timidity. But a further
reason is that military leaders have either forgotten or chosen to ignore the basic
behaviors by which civil-military relations support military effectiveness and civilian control at the same time.
“The dirty little secret of American civil-military Whatever the causes, the consequences are dangerous. Increased
relations . . . is that the commander in chief
does not command the military establishment; military influence, combined
with the American people’s ignohe cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necesrance of or indifference to civilian
sary, appeases it.”
control and the misreading of the
bounds of professional behavior on the part of senior military officers, could in
the future produce a civil-military clash that damages American government or
compromises the nation’s defense.
That civilians in the executive and legislative branches of government over
the last generation bear ultimate responsibility for these developments is beyond doubt. Some on both sides seem to sense it. Secretaries of defense came
into office in 1989, 1993, and 2001 concerned about military subordination and
determined to exert their authority. Civilian officials have the obligation to
make the system work, not to abdicate for any reason. But to rely on the politicians to restore the proper balance is to ignore the conditions and processes that
can frustrate civilian control. The historical record is not encouraging. Over two
centuries, the officials elected and appointed to rule the military have varied
enormously in knowledge, experience, understanding, and motivation. Their
propensity to exercise civilian control and to provide sound, forceful leadership
107
has been variable, largely situational, and unpredictable.
Nor can the changes in American society and political understanding that
have weakened civilian control be easily reversed. National defense will capture
at best superficial public attention even during a war on terrorism, unless military operations are ongoing or the government asks for special sacrifice. In wartime, Americans want to rely more on military advice and authority, not less.
Over time, a smaller and smaller percentage of Americans are likely to perform
military service; without a conscious effort by the media to avoid caricaturing
military culture, and by colleges and universities to expand programs in military
history and security studies, future generations of civilian leaders will lack not
only the experience of military affairs but the comprehension of the subject
needed to make civilian control work effectively.
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A better way to alter the equation is for officers to recall the attitudes and rejuvenate the behaviors that civilian control requires. Certainly every officer supports the concept; every officer swears at commissioning “to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States” and to “bear true faith and allegiance” to
108
the same. Because civilian control pervades the Constitution, the oath is a personal promise to preserve, protect, defend, and support civilian control, in actual practice as well as in words. The requirement for such an oath was written
109
into the Constitution for precisely that purpose. Officers do not swear to strive
to maximize their services’ budgets, or to try to achieve certain policy outcomes,
or to attempt to reshape civilian life toward a military vision of the good society.
Individual officers at every level would do well to examine their personal
views of civilians, particularly of their clients: the American people, elected officials, and those appointed to exercise responsibility in national security affairs.
A certain amount of caution, skepticism, and perhaps even mistrust is healthy.
But contempt for clients destroys the professional relationship. Lawyers cannot
provide sound counsel, doctors effective treatment, ministers worthwhile support, teachers significant education—when they do not understand and respect
their clients. Military officers who feel contempt for their elected or appointed
supervisors, or the voters who placed them in office, are unlikely to advise them
wisely or carry out their policies effectively.
Officers should investigate their own professional views of civilian control. On
what do you base your thinking? Much of the problem I have discussed may stem
from the Cold War, or from one particular campaign of it, Vietnam, which continues to cast a long, if sometimes unnoticed, shadow. Are you positive that your
thinking about civil-military relations does not rest on the mistaken beliefs—and
they are mistaken—that the war was lost because of too much civilian control, or
that we succeeded so magnificently in the Persian Gulf in 1991 because the civil110
ians “[got] out of the way and let the military fight and win the war”? Neither of
111
those interpretations fit the facts of what happened in either war.
Ponder whether you are prepared to accept, as a principle of civilian control,
that it includes the right of civilians to be wrong, to make mistakes—indeed, to
112
insist on making mistakes. This may be very hard to accept, given that people’s
lives, or the security of the nation, hang in the balance. But remember that the
military can be wrong, dead wrong, about military affairs—for after all, you are
not politicians, and as Carl von Clausewitz wrote long ago, war is an extension of
113
politics. Were you prepared to work for and with, and to accept, a Gore administration had the Democratic candidate won the 2000 election? If there is doubt
on your part, ponder the implications for civil-military relations and civilian
control. It is likely that within the next dozen years, there will be another
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Democratic administration. If the trend toward increasing friction and hostility
in civil-military relations during the last three—those of Johnson, Carter, and
Clinton—continues into the future, the national security of the United States
will not be well served.
Last of all, consider that if civilian control is to function effectively, the uniformed military will have not only to forswear or abstain from certain behavior
but actively encourage civilians to exercise their authority and perform their legal and constitutional duty to make policy and decisions. You cannot and will
not solve those problems yourselves, nor is it your responsibility alone. Civilian
behavior and historical circumstances are just as much the causes of the present
problems in civil-military relations as any diminution of military professionalism. But you can help educate and develop civilian leaders in their roles and on
the processes of policy making, just as your predecessors did, by working with
them and helping them—without taking advantage of them, even when the opportunity arises. Proper professional behavior calls for a certain amount of abstinence. What is being asked of you is no more or less than is asked of other
professionals who must subordinate their self-interest when serving their clients
and customers: lawyers to act against their self-interest and advise clients not to
press frivolous claims; doctors not to prescribe treatments that are unnecessary;
accountants to audit their clients’ financial statements fully and honestly; clergy114
men to refrain from exploiting the trust of parishioners or congregants. It will
be up to you to shape the relationship with your particular client, just as others do.
At its heart, the relationship involves civilian control in fact as well as form.
Civilian control ultimately must be considered in broad context. In the long history of human civilization, there have been military establishments that have focused on external defense—on protecting their societies—and those that have
115
preyed upon their own populations. The American military has never preyed
on this society. Yet democracy, as a widespread form of governance, is rather a
recent phenomenon, and our country has been fortunate to be perhaps the leading example for the rest of the world. For us, civilian control has been more a
matter of making certain the civilians control military affairs than of keeping
the military out of civilian politics. But if the United States is to teach civilian
control—professional military behavior—to countries overseas, its officers
116
must look hard at their own system and their own behavior at the same time.
Our government must champion civilian control in all circumstances, without hesitation. In April 2002 the United States acted with stupefying and
self-defeating hypocrisy when the White House initially expressed pleasure
at the apparent overthrow of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela by that
country’s military, condoning an attempted coup while other nations in the
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hemisphere shunned the violation of democratic and constitutional pro117
cess. “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise,” Winston Churchill shrewdly observed in 1947. “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the
118
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried.”
Churchill certainly knew the tensions involved in civil-military relations as well
as any democratic head of government in modern history. Both sides—civilian
and military—need to be conscious of these problems and to work to ameliorate
them.
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Confidence,” pp. 147ff. On p. 149 they write,
“Elite military officers evaluate civilian society far more negatively than do elite civilians.” The use of the military as a role model
for society has a long history in American
thinking; in the 1980s, the Chief of Naval Operations, James D. Watkins, was a leading
proponent of that view. Peter Grier, “Navy as
National Role Model?” Christian Science
Monitor, 4 June 1986, p. 1.
87. Sam C. Sarkesian, “The U.S. Military Must
Find Its Voice,” Orbis, Summer 1998,
pp. 423–37; James H. Webb, Jr., “The Silence
of the Admirals,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1999, pp. 29–34. Sarkesian
expanded the argument in Sam C. Sarkesian
and Robert E. Connor, Jr., The U.S. Military
Profession into the Twenty-first Century: War,
Peace and Politics (London: Frank Cass,
1999), esp. chaps. 11, 12. Even as respected
and experienced a defense reporter as George
C. Wilson has implied that the senior military
leadership should speak out publicly in disagreement with their civilian superiors. This
sentiment became something of a mantra in
the middle and late 1990s as senior officers
were accused of caving in to political correctness. See Wilson, “Joint Chiefs Need to Be
More Gutsy,” National Journal, 20 November
1999, p. 3418.
88. Webb, “Silence of the Admirals,” p. 34.
89. Crowe, Line of Fire, p. 214. The 1998–99
TISS survey asked under what circumstances
“it is acceptable for a military member to
leak unclassified information or documents
to the press.” The figures for active-duty officers were (rounded up):
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Opinion

Agree
(%)

Disagree
(%)

No Opinion
(%)

“A crime has been committed and the chain
of command is not acting on it.”

26

70

4

“Doing so may prevent a policy that will
lead to unnecessary casualties.”

30

65

6

“Doing so discloses a course of action that
is morally or ethically wrong.”

28

65

7

“He or she is ordered to by a superior.”

17

76

7

“Doing so brings to light a military policy
or course of action that may lead to a disaster for the country.”

39

55

6

“Never”

41

49

10

Reserve and National Guard officers were
slightly more willing to agree to leak, but a
higher percentage of them (46 percent) answered “never.”
90. Peter J. Skibitski, “New Commandant Intends to Push for More Resources for Pentagon,” Inside the Navy, 15 November 1999,
p. 1; Hunter Keeter, “Marine Commandant
Calls for Defense Spending Increase,” Defense
Daily, 16 August 2000, p. 6; John Robinson,
“Outgoing 6th Fleet Commander Warns Fleet
Size Is Too Small,” Defense Daily, 22 September 2000, p. 1; Elaine M. Grossman, “Defense
Budget Boost to 4 Percent of GDP Would
Pose Dramatic Shift,” Inside the Pentagon, 31
August 2000, p. 3; Steven Lee Myers, “A Call
to Put the Budget Surplus to Use for the Military,” New York Times, 28 September 2000,
p. A24; Cindy Rupert, “Admiral: Navy Pales
to Past One,” Tampa Tribune, 21 October
2000, p. 2; Linda de France, “Senior Navy Officers: ‘We Need More Ships, Planes, Subs,’”
Aerospace Daily, 30 October 2000, and “In
Next QDR, ‘Budgets Need to Support Our
Tasking,’ General Says,” Aerospace Daily, 4 December 2000; Vickii Howell, “Admiral Tells
Civic Clubs Navy Needs More Ships, Subs,”
Birmingham (Alabama) News, 16 November
2000, p. 6B; Robert I. Natter, “Help Keep This
the Greatest Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2000, p. 2; Rowan
Scarborough, “Military Expects Bush to Perform,” Washington Times, 26 December 2000,
p. 1.
91. Rowan Scarborough, “Cohen Tells Military
Leaders ‘Not to Beat Drum with Tin Cup,’”
Washington Times, 8 September 2000, p. 4.
Secretary Cohen told them, according to his
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spokesman, “to be honest but. . . .” According
to Thomas E. Ricks and Robert Suro, “Military Budget Maneuvers Target Next President,” Washington Post, 5 June 2000, p. 1, the
armed services began ignoring civilian orders
on the budget as early as June 2000, in order
to “target” the next administration. “‘We’re
going for the big money,’ an officer on the
Joint Staff was quoted as saying. . . . Pentagon
insiders say the Clinton administration,
which long has felt vulnerable on military issues, doesn’t believe it can afford a public
feud with the chiefs—especially in the midst
of Gore’s campaign. So, these officials say,
aides to defense Secretary William S. Cohen
are seeking only to avoid confrontation and
to tamp down the controversy. . . . One career
bureaucrat in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense said privately that he was offended
by the arrogant tone service officials have
used in recent discussions. . . . By contrast, a
senior military official said the chiefs’ budget
demands represent a ‘repudiation of bankrupt thinking’ in both the White House and
Congress, which have asked the military to
conduct a growing number of missions
around the world in recent years without
paying the full bill.”
92. Bradley Graham, “Joint Chiefs Doubted Air
Strategy,” Washington Post, 5 April 1999,
p. A1. See also Kenneth R. Rizer [Maj.,
USAF], Military Resistance to Humanitarian
War in Kosovo and Beyond: An Ideological Explanation, Air University Library, Fairchild
Paper (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press,
2000), pp. 1–2, 7, 41–2.
93. The regular public promotion of service interests by officers began when the Navy and
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Army in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries formed coherent understandings of their own roles in national defense
and formal doctrines for war-fighting in their
respective domains of sea and land (and later
air). The institutionalization of service advice
on military subjects and public pronouncements on national security affairs has circumscribed civilian control to a degree. Efforts to
limit the military’s public voice, beginning
perhaps in the first Wilson administration
(1913–17), have been episodic and often ineffective. See Allan R. Millett, The American
Political System and Civilian Control of the
Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus:
Mershon Center of the Ohio State University,
1979), pp. 19, 27–30; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, pp. 301–13, 362–71; Abrahamson,
America Arms for a New Century, pp. 147–50;
Betros, “Officer Professionalism,” in press;
Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers,
pp. 68–9.
94. Published in New York by HarperCollins,
1997. The author was McMaster’s adviser at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 1992–96, for the seminar papers, master’s thesis, and Ph.D. dissertation that resulted in the book.
95. McMaster hints at such an interpretation
only by implying that the Army chief of staff,
Harold K. Johnson, might have been justified
in resigning (p. 318); by implying that the
chiefs should have “confront[ed] the president with their objections to McNamara’s approach to the war” (p. 328); by stating that
“the president . . . expected the Chiefs to lie”
and “the flag officers should not have tolerated it” (p. 331); and by blaming the chiefs
for going along with a strategy they believed
would fail, and thus sharing the culpability
with their deceitful civilian superiors for losing the war “in Washington, D.C., even before Americans assumed sole responsibility
for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war; indeed, even before the first American units were deployed”
(pp. 333–4). The interpretation of long
standing in military thinking since the Vietnam War is that the war lacked clear objectives; that it was lost because a fallacious
strategy was imposed by deceitful politicians
who limited American power and
micromanaged military operations; and
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because the American people, with no stake
in the war (in part because elites avoided service), were biased against the American effort
by a hostile press. Rosemary Mariner, a retired naval captain and pioneer naval aviator,
remembers “a certain litany to the Vietnam
War story” in “every ready room” and at every “happy hour” from “flight training and
throughout subsequent tactical aviation assignments” (she was commissioned in 1973),
a “tribal lore that Robert S. McNamara was
the devil incarnate whom the Joint Chiefs obviously didn’t have the balls to stand up to. . . .
Had the generals and admirals resigned in
protest or conducted some kind of a second
‘admiral’s revolt,’ the war would have either
been won or stopped.” Thus Mariner’s “initial reaction to McMaster’s book was that it
simply affirmed what had been viewed as
common wisdom.” Conversation with the
author, 13 April 2000, Durham, N.C.; e-mail
to the author, 14 May 2001. Indications of
the impact of Vietnam on officer thinking are
in George C. Herring, “Preparing Not to
Fight the Last War: The Impact of the Vietnam War on the U.S. Military,” in After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War, ed. Charles Neu
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
2000), pp. 73–7; David Howell Petraeus, “The
American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the
Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era” (Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1987); and Frank Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way of War
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
96. Fogleman explained his motives in a 1997 interview and specifically rejected the notion
that he resigned in protest. Kohn, ed., “Early
Retirement of Fogleman,” pp. 6–23, esp. p. 20.
97. While there is no tradition of resignation in
the American armed forces, it has happened,
and occasionally senior officers have considered or threatened it. In 1907, “Admiral
Willard H. Brownson resigned as chief of
the Bureau of Navigation after the president
[Theodore Roosevelt], over Brownson’s protests, appointed a surgeon rather than a line
officer to command a hospital ship.” Oyos,
“Roosevelt, Congress, and the Military,”
p. 325. George C. Marshall offered or intimated resignation, or was reported to have
done so, at least a half-dozen times when
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chief of staff, but he claimed later to have
actually threatened it only once—and in
retrospect characterized his action as “reprehensible.” Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope (New York: Viking,
1966), pp. 461 n. 33, 97–103, 285–7, and
George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory,
1943–1945 (New York: Viking, 1973),
pp. 246–7, 492–3, 510–1. General Harold K.
Johnson considered resigning several times,
and in August 1967 the Joint Chiefs (absent
one member) considered resigning as a
group over the Vietnam War. See Lewis
Sorley, Honorable Warrior: General Harold
K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998), pp.
181–2, 223–4, 263, 268–70, 285–7, 303–4. In
1977, on a flight to Omaha from Washington, General F. Michael Rogers suggested to
four of his colleagues that all of the Air
Force’s four-stars should resign over President Jimmy Carter’s cancelation of the B-1
bomber, but nothing came of the discussion.
See Erik Riker-Coleman, “Political Pressures
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Case of
General David C. Jones,” paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Society for Military History, Calgary, Alberta, 27 May 2001.
The source for the discussion of mass resignation is Bruce Holloway [Gen., USAF], oral
history interview by Vaughn H. Gallacher
[Lt. Col., USAF], 16–18 August 1977, pp.
424–6, U.S. Air Force Historical Research
Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. In a discussion about pressure to resign over the
cancelation of the B-1, General David C.
Jones (oral history interview by Lt. Col.
Maurice N. Marynow, USAF, and Richard H.
Kohn, August–October 1985 and January–March 1986, pp. 178–9, 181) commented, “I think there are cases where
people should perhaps resign: first, if they
are ever pressured to do something immoral, illegal, or unethical; second, if you
possibly felt you hadn’t had your day in
court—if you hadn’t been able to express
your views; or if we had been inhibited in
the conversation to the Congress. . . . It
seems to me that it is very presumptuous
that somebody in the military can set themselves up on a pedestal, that they have the
answer to the country, that the President
who has just been elected on a platform of
cutting the defense budget, is somehow so
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wrong that we are in this pedestal position,
that we know the answers in this country. . . .
It is up to the military to make its case, and
then salute smartly once that case is made. . . .
The only thing I have seen while I was in the
military that really would be . . . a condition
of resignation would be somehow during
the Vietnam War. But probably . . . it would
have been for the wrong reasons[—] . . . the
White House . . . determining the targets . . .
or whatever. The more fundamental reason
is how in the world did we get ourselves involved in a land war in Southeast Asia[?]. . .
[W]e are really servants of the people. The
people make their decisions on the President. We are not elected; the President is
elected. It’s only in that regard if number
one, they are trying to corrupt you by ignoring you and by muzzling you and all that
sort of stuff. . . . Or if something is of such
national importance, and I’m not sure anybody can predict it.” In 1980, General Edward N. Meyer, chief of staff of the Army,
was asked by the secretary of the Army to rescind a statement he had made to Congress
about “a hollow army.” Meyer refused and
offered his resignation, but it was not accepted. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, pp. 201–3.
Retired Marine Corps commandant Charles
C. Krulak (question and answer session,
Joint Services Conference on Professional
Ethics, Springfield, Virginia, 27–28 January
2000, enclosed in an e-mail from a colleague
to the author, 1 February 2000) claimed that
“it had become known within the Pentagon
that 56 Marine General Officers would ‘turn
in their suits’ if mixed gender training were
imposed on the Marine Corps. . . . The
Marines drew a line in the sand, and the opposition folded.”
98. Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My
American Journey (New York: Random
House, 1995), p. 167.
99. Ibid., p. 149. In May 1983, then Lieutenant
Colonel Wesley Clark “suggested a line of
argument” to then Brigadier General Powell
for introducing a transition plan to the incoming Army chief of staff: “Isn’t the most
important thing never to commit U.S.
troops again unless we’re going in to win?
No more gradualism and holding back like
in Vietnam, but go in with overwhelming
force?” According to Clark, “Powell agreed. . . .
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This argument captured what so many of us
felt after Vietnam.” Clark, Waging Modern
War, p. 7. Clark remembered that “in the
Army, it had long been an article of resolve
that there would be ‘no more Vietnams,’
wars in which soldiers carried the weight of
the nation’s war despite the lack of public
support at home” (p. 17).
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105. Kohn, ed., “Early Retirement of Fogleman,”
p. 18. Another possible resignation was
voiced privately in 2000. Conversation with a
senior military officer, January 2001.
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102. Frank Hoffman e-mail to the author, 14
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tional security study group assisting the U.S.
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2000, pp. 46–51; Gore Vidal, “Washington,
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tary officers in the NSC were coordinating a
2000, pp. 136ff.
rapid schedule to preclude the president from
announcing a Clinton Doctrine on the use of 107. For the long-term congressional forfeiture of
authority in national security, see Louis
force in late October. It was expressed in the
Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War &
conversation that it was hoped that publishSpending (College Station: Texas A&M Univ.
ing a strategy with narrow use of force criteria
Press, 2000), chaps. 1–4.
would cut out the president from contradicting himself late in the month in a speech that 108. The oath every American military officer
would contravene the military’s idea of how
takes upon commissioning reads: “I, [name],
to use military force.”
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
103. Kohn, ed., “Early Retirement of Fogleman,”
United States against all enemies, foreign and
p. 12.
domestic; that I will bear true faith and alle104. “Why is it . . . that whatever the question
giance to the same; that I take this obligation
is—enforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia,
freely, without any mental reservation or purevacuating the U.N. from Bosnia, or invading
pose of evasion; and that I will well and faithHaiti, the answer is always 25,000 Army
fully discharge the duties of the office on
troops?” asked one Marine officer of a rewhich I am about to enter. So help me God.”
porter. By mid-1995, the uniformed leadership
The requirement and wording is in 5 U.S.C.
was more divided on opposing interventions.
§3331 (1966). An oath to support the ConstiSee Thomas E. Ricks, “Colin Powell’s Doctrine
tution is required of “all executive and judion Use of Military Force Is Now Being Quescial officers” as well as senators and
tioned by Senior U.S. Officers,” Wall Street
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National Security: The Intent of the
Framers,” in The United States Military under
the Constitution of the United States,
1789-1989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York:
New York Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 61–94.
110. This is George Bush’s characterization, in “A
Nation Blessed,” Naval War College Review,
Autumn 2001, p. 138. The actual civil-military
relationship and the extent of civilian oversight are revealed in the works cited in
endnote 111, below.
111. A good bibliography of the literature on the
Vietnam War is George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and
Vietnam, 1950–1975, 3d ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1996). The most convincing
explanations of the American defeat explore
the inability of the United States and South
Vietnam to prevent communist forces from
contesting the countryside and thereby continuing combat, and the failure to establish
an indigenous government that could command the loyalty or obedience of the population, in the crucial period 1965–68, before
the American people lost patience with the
cost and inconclusiveness of the struggle and
forced American disengagement. The best
discussion to date of civil-military relations
in the Persian Gulf War is Michael R.
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor,
The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the
Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown,
1995). The memoirs of Generals Powell and
Schwarzkopf confirm the very strong oversight and occasional intervention by the
Bush administration in strategy and operations during the fighting. The senior British
commander in the Gulf, General Sir Peter de
la Billiere, Storm Command: A Personal Account (London: HarperCollins, 1992), remembers (p. 103) that “Schwarzkopf was
under intense pressure from Washington . . .
to consider other plans being dreamt up
by amateur strategists in the Pentagon,”
but (pp. 139–40) that as late as early December 1990 he “had no written directive
as to how he should proceed[,] . . . no precise instructions as to whether he was to attack Iraq as a whole, march on Baghdad,
capture Saddam, or what.” See also George
Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Random House, 1998),
pp. 302ff.
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112. That civilian control includes the right of the
civilians to be “wrong” is the insight of Peter
D. Feaver. See his “The Civil-Military
Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and
the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed
Forces & Society, vol. 23, 1996, p. 154.
113. The importance of firm civilian control, even
to the point of interference in technical military matters, in order to assure a strong connection between ends and means, is the
argument of Eliot A. Cohen, “The Unequal
Dialogue,” in Soldiers and Civilians, ed.
Feaver and Kohn, chap. 12.
114. S. L. A. Marshall, the famous journalist and
reserve officer who from the 1930s through
the 1970s studied and wrote so influentially
about soldiers, soldiering, battle, and war,
was not contrasting the military from other
professions but people in uniform from all
others when he wrote: “The placing of the
line of duty above the line of self interest . . .
is all that distinguishes the soldier from the
civilian. And if that aspect of military education is slighted for any reason, the nation has
lost its main hold on security.” The Soldier’s
Load and the Mobility of a Nation (1947; repr.
Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association,
1980), p. 104.
115. I am indebted to University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill emeritus professor of political
science Raymond Dawson for this
distinction.
116. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has created at least three
new institutes for security studies to teach
democratic defense practices, particularly civilian control of the military, to other nations. Presently there are at least four, meant
to serve uniformed officers, defense officials,
and political leaders from formerly communist countries in Europe and Central Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific
region.
117. Larry Rohter, “Fear of Loss of Democracy Led
Neighbors to Aid Return,” New York Times,
15 April 2002, p. A6; Christopher Marquis,
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Ousted Leader,” New York Times, 16 April
2002, pp. A1, A8; and Peter Hakim, “Democracy and U.S. Credibility,” New York Times,
21 April 2002, p. 4 wk.
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118. Speech to the House of Commons, 11 November 1947, quoted in Robert Rhodes
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